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I. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2d-3 (2)(e) (1987) granting appeals from district 
court in criminal cases involving a third degree felony. 
n. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction entered in 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Criminal Case No. 88932. 
Defendants were each convicted of one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 
(1) (a) (iv) (1986) and one count of possession of a controlled substance 
without tax stamps affixed, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-19-106 
(1988), both third degree felonies. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the investigative stop, detention and subsequent search 
of the defendants vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
a. whether the traffic stop of the vehicle was a pretext. 
b. whether the investigative detention of defendants was illegal 
because it was not based on reasonable suspicion and lasted longer 
than necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop. 
c. whether the consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary 
because it was obtained pursuant to an illegal detention. 
2. Whether the UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT is 
unconstitutional in that it violates Article I, § 8 cl. 3 of the United States 
Constitution. 
3. Whether the UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT violates 
defendants privilege against self-incrimination as guarranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMhNA i i V E 
United States Constitution AnuMidmeni V. 
United States Constitution Article I, § 8, cl. 3. 
United States Constitution Amendment IV. 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 14. . 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1986). 
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-101 through!07 (1«»KK v I Ad.tni.li.i.. " \"\ 
-3-
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 14, 1988, Defendants, Robinson and Towers were each 
charged by information with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third degree felong, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1986) (R.43-44). The 
State filed an Amended Information on May 9, 1988, which, in addition to 
the possession with intent to distribute charge, charged both defendants 
with one count of possession of marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a 
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §59-19-106 (1988) 
(R.45-46). The charges were the result of a traffic stop, detention and 
subsequent search of the defendants vehicle. 
Prior to trial, defendants filed a Motion to Suppress and a Motion to 
Dismiss Count II of the Amended Information involving the tax stamps. 
(R.50-52). Based upon testimony heard and received at a hearing on the 
motion to suppress and memoranda submitted by counsel, the trial court 
denied the motion and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order. (R.117-123). The court found that Trooper Garcia stopped the 
vehicle driven by Towers for the traffic violation of swerving 
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contrary to public policy. (R-128). The court found further that marijuana 
is not a legitimate article of commerce since it is unlawful to possess, 
transport or sell. 
In applying the United States Supreme Court test for determining 
whether the tax violates defendant's fifth amendment right against 
self-incrimination, the court found that the tax payer is not compelled to 
give any information whatsoever, other than the quanity of stamps desired 
to be purchased nor is there a registration form or tax return; the only 
requirements are that the tax amount be paid and the stamps affixed to 
the controlled substance. (R-130). In addition, there is no compelled 
information which would prove a "significant link" in the chain of evidence 
tending to establish guilt because the stamp does not identify the 
purchasers. (131). 
Finally, the court found further that the statute is not vague as its 
terms are specifically defined and it is otherwise clear as to where to affix 
the stamps. (R-132). 
Following the denial of both motions, defense counsel submitted the 
case to the court based on the stipulation of counsel. The court found both 
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defendants guilty of Count I and Count II and sentenced them to 
concurrent terms of 0 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison on both counts 
notwithstanding the States1 recommendation of probation. The trial court 
granted certification for probable case as to Count II but denied 
certification as to Count I. (R-156). The Court of Appeals denied a 
Certificate of Probable Cause as to both counts and this appeal followed. 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 12, 1988, at 10:35 a.m. defendants Kim Alexander P. 
Robinson and Francis Xavier Towers were travelling in a gray van with 
California license plates, east on 1-80 up Parleys Canyon. (R-5). At the 
same time, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, Anthony Garcia, was travelling in 
the left lane and was attempting to pass the van when it swerved into the 
passing lane about a foot and 1/2 and quickly returned to the right lane. 
(R-6). The toooper proceeded to stop the van and was joined by Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper, Lane Ogden, who had been following in close 
proximity. (R-6). 
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Trooper Garcia approached the van and asked the driver, Towers, for 
his license and registration to the vehicle, while Trooper Ogden approached 
the passenger side of the van. Towers gave Trooper Garcia his license but 
did not produce a registration. (R-8). Robinson explained that the van was 
owned by his boss who had given them permission to drive the van from 
California to Wyoming. (R-9). Robinson then gave Trooper Garcia a 
telephone number where he could reach his boss and pulled out a sign 
from behind the seat which said, "Shamrock Floor Covering" indicating 
where he worked and the business telephone number. (R-10). The trooper 
observed that the telephone number Robinson had given him was not the 
same as the number on the sign. (R-10). 
Trooper Garcia then asked Robinson and Towers where they were 
going and they responded that they were going to the Wind Rivers, 
Wyoming, fishing. The trooper looked into the van and noticed that the 
two did not have, what he considered, suitable gear for such a trip. (R-10). 
While talking to Towers, Trooper Garcia also noticed there was a built-up 
homemade bed inside the van that extended from the driver and 
passengers seat all the way to the rear doors. (R-14). While Trooper Ogden 
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remained at the van talking to Robinson and Towers, Trooper Garcia 
returned to his patrol car and tried unsuccessfully to verify ownership of 
the van and then issued a warning citation to Towers for the lane violation. 
(R-12). 
Based on Trooper Ogden's conversation with Robinson and Towers, 
the troopers decided that they would ask Towers and Robinson for consent 
to search their vehicle. (R-13). Trooper Garcia first asked the defendants if 
they were carrying any weapons, large sums of money, or narcotics in the 
vehicle. (R-14). Both Robinson and Towers said no. Then Trooper Garcia 
asked them if they could make a search of their vehicle and Robinson 
responded, "Sure go ahead". (R-14). At that time, Trooper Garcia told 
Robinson to get the keys to the van and to open the back doors. The 
trooper then saw that the opening of the homemade bed was covered with 
a piece of plywood. (R-16). Trooper Garcia also observed what he believed 
to be marijuana seeds on the floor of the van. (R-16). 
Unable to see inside of the homemade bed as he had hoped, Trooper 
Garcia asked Robinson what was under the bed and Robinson replied that it 
contained the "personal belongings" of his boss. The trooper then asked 
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Robinson how they could get access to the underneath of of the bed and 
Robinson replied that access could be gained through the side door of the 
van which was broken. (R-17). Trooper Garcia asked Robinson if he could 
try and open the door and, after Robinson unlocked it, opened the door. 
(R-17). 
Still unable to see into the built-up bed, Trooper Garcia asked 
Robinson if he could remove some screws from the plywood board so he 
could see underneath the bed. Robinson again said no because his boss 
kept his personal belongings under there. (R-19). Trooper Garcia then told 
Robinson and Towers that he was going to impound the vehicle and get a 
search warrant, however, if Robinson would let them look under the bed 
then they could be on their way. (R-48-57). Robinson again said no to the 
search. 
Trooper Ogden then asked Robinson and Towers if they could bring a 
narcotics canine from the airport to go through the van, to which Robinson 
replied "Yes" but asked, "Does this mean I am giving consent to the 
search?" to which the trooper replied, "yes". Both Robinson and Towers 
testified that they flatly denied consent to have the dog sniff the van. 
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Consequently, Trooper Garcia contacted narcotics agents and requested a 
canine to respond to the scene. After another twenty minutes, the dog 
arrived and, in the course of the search, the dog alerted positively 
indicating the presence of controlled substances and Robinson and Towers 
were arrested. Following the arrest, the troopers obtained a search 
warrant for the van and located approximately 243 pounds of marijuana 
located in the built-up compartment within the van. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The investigative stop, detention and subsequent search of the 
van violated the defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures as guarranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. A brief 
investigatory stop of a vehicle is justified if an officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity or if a traffic violation is committed in the 
officer's presence. In this case, Trooper Garcia testified that he stopped the 
defendant's van to issue a warning for a lane violation. A traffic stop is 
considered a pretext to search for evidence of criminal activity if a 
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reasonable hypothetical police officer would not have made the stop absent 
an articulated suspicion of criminal activity. Since, a reasonable 
hypothetical police officer would not have stopped the vehicle for a 
common place lane violation, the traffic stop was a pretext to search the 
van for evidence of drug trafficking. Accordingly, the evidence seized as a 
result of the primary illegality, the pretext stop, should be suppressed. 
In addition, the further detention of Robinsion and Towers following 
the traffic stop was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
since neither defendant was free to leave. A seizure or investigative 
detention is justified only if the officer has a reasonable, articuable 
suspicion that a defendant has committed a crime. This suspicion cannot 
be unparticularized or based upon a "hunch". 
In this case, Trooper Garcia relied primarily upon the "nervousness" 
of the defendants coupled with the lack of suitable outdoor-gear and the 
presence of only one fishing pole as the sole basis for believing Robinson 
and Towers were engaged in criminal activity, "Nervousness" alone, 
however, is not a legitimate factor giving rise to a reasonable suspicion and 
has been flatly rejected as such by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
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Court of Appeals. Therefore, Trooper Garcia did not have a reasonable 
articuable suspicion necessary to justify the further detention of Robinson 
and Towers following the intitial traffic stop. 
Moreover, an investigative detention may last only as long as 
necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop. The purpose of the stop in 
this case was to issue a warning citation for a lane violation. Though that 
purpose was accomplished in a matter of minutes, the troopers detained 
Robinson and Towers approximately forty minutes while consistently 
trying to obtain consent to search a compartment located within the van. 
Consequently, the seizure of the defendants was unreasonable and violated 
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Accordingly, the evidence seized as a result of the illegal 
detention should be suppressed. 
Finally, Robinson's consent to the canine search of the built-up bed 
was obtained as a result of the illegal detention and therefore is invalid. 
The troopers repeatedly asked Robinson for consent to search the built-up 
bed located within the van and Robinson continously refused consent. 
Nonetheless, over a period of forty minutes, the troopers were finally 
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successful in getting Robinson's consent to a canine search of the van. At 
no time did the troopers advise either defendant of the right to refuse 
consent but rather repeatedly told them that they would not be released 
unless they would let the troopers see what was in the compartment. In 
addition, the troopers told Robinson and Towers that the van would be 
impounded and a search warrant obtained unless they consented to the 
search which led the defendants to believe that they had no choice. 
Therefore, the consent was not voluntary and the evidence obtained as a 
result of the search pursuant to such consent should be suppressed. 
II . The Utah Illegal Drug Tax is unconstitutional in that it violates 
the interstate commerce clause, by taxing an individual participating in 
interstate commerce who was merely travelling through the state. The 
defendants did not have a sufficient nexus to the state to be required to 
pay a tax in the state. The tax is not fairly apportioned and it discriminates 
against interstate commerce. Furthermore it is not related to services 
provided by the state. 
The statute is also unconstitutional in that it violates the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition against forced incrimination by requiring 
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stickers to be placed on the marijuana. As such it is a forced admission of 
the knowledge element of the offense. 
Furthermore the statute violates the due process clause by not fully 
informing an individual of one's duties under the law. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE 
INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF THE VEHICLE VIOLATED THE 
DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES GUARRANTEED BY THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
ARTILCE I SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . United States Constitution 
Amendment IV. The United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals have found the Fourth Amendment 
applicable to "brief investigatory stops that fall short of official traditional 
arrests". State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U. S. 1, 16-17, 88S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L. Ed 889 (1968); 
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See also. State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). Accordingly, 
the stop of the vehicle in this case must comply with the constitutional 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
A brief investigatory stop of a vehicle may be constitutionally 
justified on one of two alternative grounds: (1) it can be based on a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objectve facts and the inferences a 
reasonable person would draw from those facts, that the individual or 
vehicle is involved in criminal activity; or (2) it can be incident to a lawful 
stop for a traffic violation. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975; See also. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-7-15 (1982). 
A. The traffic stop of the vehicle was pretexual 
A law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle for a traffic violation 
committed in the officer's presence, but may not "use a misdemeanor 
arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime." State v. 
Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Sierra, at 977). In 
determining whether a traffic stop and subsequent arrest is a pretext, 
courts look to the totality of circumstances. IdL Whether the Fourth 
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Amendment has been violated depends on an objective assessment of the 
officers actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at 
the time rather than the subjective intent of the officer. icL (citing 
Maryland v. Macon. 472 U. S. 463, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L. Ed 370 
(1985); Sierra, at 977). The fact that police officers have a great deal of 
discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation or effect a full arrest 
coupled with the fact that "very few drivers can traverse any appreciable 
distance without violating some traffic regulations, [makes] this [pretextual 
traffic stop] . . . indeed a frightening possibility". Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 
(quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure, §5.2 (e) (2d. Ed. 1987). Therefore, in 
determining whether Trooper Garcia's stop of the van for a lane violation 
was an unconstitutional pretext the test is "whether a hypothetical 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting 
him or her", would have stopped Robinson and Towers to issue a warning 
for crossing into the left lane, not whether the trooper could validly have 
made the stop. Sierra. 754 P.2d at 978. 
Trooper Garcia testified that he was travelling east in the left lane 
attempting to pass the defendant's van when the van swerved into the 
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passing lane about a foot and half. Towers, the driver of the van, testified 
that he did not see the trooper approaching when he was about to pass the 
slow moving tractor-trailers on the hill. The trial court found the fact that 
the van swerved into the left land causing the trooper to slam on his 
brakes was a legitimate reason for stopping the vehicle. In this regard, the 
trial court relied entirely on the subjective intent of the trooper and 
whether he c o u l d validly have made the stop. However, it is a 
well-established rule that "the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant" 
in determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, at 
least in the ocntext of pretext traffic stops. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. In no 
sense did the trial court consider or make a determination whether a 
"reasonable hypothetical officer" would have made the stop. 
In fact, abruptly swerving into the passing lane and quickly 
returning to the right lane is entirely consistent with Tower's testimony 
that he was about to enter the passing lane and didn't see the on coming 
car. It is often the case that a driver will attempt to enter the left lane and, 
because of the blind spot in the side mirror, not realize there is a vehicle 
approaching in that lane. The reflex response in that situation is to swerve 
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abruptly and return to the free lane. In this regard, it is entirely 
inconceiveable that a driver transporting 243 pounds of illegal marijuana 
for distribution would see an approaching highway patrolman in his side 
mirror and deliberately swerve into that lane to attract attention and 
arouse suspicion. It is also unlikely that a reasonable police officer would 
stop such a vehicle and issue a warning citation for the rather common 
mistake of attempting to enter the already occupied passing lane. 
It is much more plausible that Trooper Garcia noticed the van with 
California license plates and the two defendants, Robinson and Towers, and 
decided to stop them for the suspected transportation of narcotics. This 
conclusion is buttressed by the trooper's request to search the van based 
on his observation through the driver's window of the homemade bed, lack 
of suitable out-door gear and one fishing rod, coupled with the apparent 
"nervousness" of the defendants. Therefore, a reasonable officer would not 
have stopped the van and cited Towers for a lane violation absent some 
"unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity". Arroyo. 770 
P.2d at 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, since the stop itself was 
unconsitutional, all evidence subsequently seized is inadmissible and 
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should be suppressed. See e.g.. Sierra. 748 P.2d at 184; citing Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); 4W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure §11.4 (d) at 407-08 (2d Ed. 1987). 
11. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE 
THE INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION OF DEFENDANTS WAS AN 
ILLEGAL SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTILCE I SECTION 
14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The search and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment also 
apply to "seizures" which fall short of arrests. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 
87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment occurs only when the officer by means of physical force or 
show of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of a person." Ld. 
A seizure occurs "[wjhen a reasonable person, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation . . . but because he 
believes hs is not free to leave . . . State v. Johnson. 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 
35 (March 21, 1989) (quoting Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87). 
In Johnson , the court found that the defendant was "seized" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after her vehicle was stopped by a 
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police officer for a faulty break light because she was not free to leave 
when the officer told her to wait while he returned to his vehicle to check 
on her driver's license and to run a warrants check on the defendant. 
Johnson, at 35. In Johnson, as in this case, the officer reasoned that there 
was a possibility the car was stolen because the driver was unable to 
produce the registration certificate and there was no owner present. Id. 
Likewise, Trooper Garcia testified that Robinson and Towers were not free 
to leave while he attempted to verify ownership of the vehicle. Therefore, 
their detention constituted a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment . 
A. The seizure of the defendants was not based on a reasonable 
and articuable suspicion of criminal activity. 
An investigative detention or seizure is justified only if a law 
enforcement officer has "a reasonable and articuable suspicion that the 
automobile's occupants are 'involved in criminal activity'". State v. 
Schlosser. 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (May 17, 1989) See also. Johnson. 104 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. Thus, to justify the seizure of Robinson and Towers, 
Trooper Garcia had to have a reasonable "articuable suspicion" that they 
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had committed a crime. In this regard "due weight must be given, not to 
[t]he officers' inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch', but to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience". Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 391 U. S. 1, 27 (1968). 
In J o h n s o n , the court found that the seizure of the defendant, a 
passenger in the vehicle was reasonable because the initial stop of the 
vehicle was legitimate, the driver of the vehicle had a suspended license 
and there was no way of telling who the owner of the vehicle was and the 
length of the detention was only about twenty minutes. Johnson, 104 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 35. In this case, the driver of the vehicle, Towers had a valid 
license and Robinson told Trooper Garcia who owned the vehicle produced 
telephone numbers where the owner might be reached for verfication and 
stated that they had permission to be driving the van. In addition, the 
detention was double the length of that in J o h n s o n , lasting fourty (40) 
minutes rather than twenty (20). Though the trooper was unable to verify 
ownership of the van, there was no indication that the owner had reported 
the van stolen. In this regard, Trooper Garcia testified that sometimes its 
possible that the owner could be in the trunk of the vehicle and unable to 
-22-
report the vehicle stolen, notwithstanding the fact that the van did not 
have a trunk and the trooper had already observed the inside of the van 
enough to determine that there was no owner inside. (R-48). The facts that 
the trooper relied upon are "just as consistent with the more likely scenario 
that the driver borrowed the [van] from its rightful owner". Johnson, 104 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 36 (Orme, J. dissenting). 
Trooper Garcia testified further that he detained Robinson and 
Towers because of their "demeanor" at the beginning of the stop, (R-56), 
and that from the time he asked whether he could look under the bed he 
kept wondering why they wouldn't let him look. Therefore, the detention 
was not for the purpose of verifying the ownership of the vehicle but 
rather was for the purpose of looking under the bed. This conclusion is 
supported further by Trooper Garcia's testimony that he told Robinson and 
Towers that they could be on their way "if they'd just let him look under 
the bed. He did not tell them he'd let them go once ownership of the van 
had been verfied. 
The trial court found the fact that Towers appeared extremely 
nervous and said little and Robinson on the other hand, talked continously, 
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coupled with the absence of suitable cold-weather gear and the presence of 
only one fishing pole were articuable facts which gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that defendants were involved in criminal activity. However, the 
Utah S upreme Court in State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (May 17, 
1989) rejected similar facts as a basis for articuable suspicion of criminal 
activity. Id., at 40. In this regard, the court stated "[w]hen confronted 
with a traffic stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and passengers a like to 
be nervous and excited. . . search based on such common gestures and 
movements is a mere "hunch", not an articuable suspicion that satifies the 
Fourth Amendment. Id.. The court likewise rejected "nervousness" as an 
articuable fact in State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah, 1987). In 
Mendoza . the officer's conclusion of nervousness of the occupants of the 
vehicle was based on a "white knuckled" "rigid" look and failure to make 
eye contact. Id.. Justice Zimmerman found "ludicrous" the States' argument 
that because the defendants "appeared" to have been "unsettled" the 
officers had justification for suspecting criminal activity and characterized 
the argument as "pretexual Fourth Amendment gamesmanship at its worst. 
Mendoza. 748 P.2d at 187 (Zimmerman J. concurring). 
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Trooper Garcia relied upon the "nervous" conduct of both defendants 
as forming the basis of a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify further 
investigation. However, the trooper did not articuate, nor did the trial 
court find, how the defendants nervousness "was any different from that 
observed in countless travelers." State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 944 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). In this regard, the officer's mere conclusion regarding [the] 
defendant's nervousness, unsupported by relevant objective facts, can have 
no weight in determining if he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. IdL at 945. 
B. The detention was unreasonable because it lasted longer than 
necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop or to dispel the 
officer's suspicion in a short period of time. 
Finally, for the detention to be reasonable, it must be "temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop" 
and the "investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive 
means reasonable available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a 
short period of time." Florida v. Rover. 460 U. S. 491, 103 s. Ct. 1319, 75 L. 
Ed. 2d. 229 (1983). The detention in this case lasted approximately forty 
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minutes and thus was not temporary. In addition, the trooper effecuated 
the purpose of the stop, writing a warning citation for a lane violation, 
within the first few minutes following the stop. Nor were the troopers able 
to dispel the their suspicions in a short period of time but rather 
consistently tried to obtain consent to search an area of the van to which 
the defendants flatly denied access over a period of fourty minutes until, 
Robinson finally consented to the search. Therefore, the dentention of the 
defendants following the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of 
their Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the evidence seized as a 
result of the illegal detention should be suppressed. 
I I I . THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE 
CONSENT TO SEARCH THE BUILT-UP BED INSIDE THE VEHICLE 
WAS NOT VOLUNTARY. 
A. The consent is invalid because it was given pursuant to an 
illegal detention. 
Though Robinson eventually consented to a sniff search of the van 
by a canine, the consent was obtained pursuant to an illegal detention and 
is therefore invalid. The United States Supreme Court, in Florida v. Rover, 
460 U. S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 Ed. 2d 110 (1983), found that consent 
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obtained as the result of an illegal detention was ineffective to justify a 
subsequent search. Id.. 103 S. Ct. at 1329. In Rover, officers lawfully 
questioned a suspected drug courier in an airport concourse and then 
asked the suspect to accompany them to a police room without returning 
his drivers license or ticket which they had obtained, id., at 1322. The 
officers then asked Royer for his consent to a search of his suitcases and 
Royer consented. Though the detention was only fifteen minutes in 
duration, the Supreme Court held that Royer was, as a practical matter, 
under arrest at the time he unlocked the suitcases. Thus, the court 
concluded that the consent was the fruit of an illegal arrest and was 
therefore invalid and suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the 
search. U. at 1329. 
In this regard, the court, in Rover, concluded that the detention 
which the suspect was subjected to at the time he consented to the search 
was "a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on 
mere suspicion of criminal activity". Id., at 1327. Since Royer was not free 
to leave, the court reasoned, "any consensual aspects of the encounter had 
evaporated". Therefore, the encounter had turned into an arrest requiring 
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probable cause. Id.. The court also noted that, had Royer refused consent to 
a search of his luggage, the officers would have held the luggage and 
sought a search warrant to authorize the search. Id. 
In this case, Robinson and Towers had been detained over twenty 
minutes and Robinson had repeatedly denied consent to search the 
built-up compartment located within the van. As in Royer, Robinson was 
clearly under arrest at the time he finally consented to the canine search. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that neither defendant was free to 
leave and by Trooper Garcia's testimony that he told Robinson and Towers 
they could be on their way only if they would let the troopers look inside 
the built-up compartment within the van. In this regard, had Robinson 
refused consent to the canine search, troopers testified that they would 
have impounded the van and sought a search warrant to authorize the 
search. Clearly, as in Rover, "any consenual aspects of the encounter had 
evaporated" at this point. In addition, Robinson and Towers were never 
advised of their right to refuse consent by either trooper which was 
another factor considered determinative by the court in Royer. Id., at 1327. 
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In conclusion, Robinson's eventual consent was obtained as the result 
of an illegal detention and therefore is ineffective. Even if the initial stop 
of the van and subsequent detention of the van were reasonable, the 
defendants as a practical matter, were under arrest at the time consent 
was given, therefore the confinement went beyond the limited restraint of 
an investigative stop and, in the absence of probable cause, was illegal. 
Rover at 1326. As previously discussed, the facts relied upon by Trooper 
the defendants and are certainly not sufficient to constitute probable cause 
for arrest as required by Rover . Consequently, Robinson's consent was 
"tainted by the illegality requiring reversal" in the absence of probable 
cause. IcL Therefore, the consent obtained pursuant to the illegal detention 
is ineffective to justify the search nor sufficiently voluntary to purge the 
taint of the primary illegality. Accordingly, the evidence seized as a result 
of the search based on the involuntary consent should be suppressed. 
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IX, ARGUMENT 
I. THE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT 
IT VIOLATES THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power 
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several 
states . •..n U.S.C.A., Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Consti-
tution has long been interpreted to give Congress the exclusive 
power to regulate interstate commerce and the sole power to act 
in the area of taxation on interstate commerce. Northwestern 
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 
(1959). Congress1 power under the Constitution applies to all 
commerce including trade in marijuana. The federal government 
has passed numerous laws regulating trade in marijuana and other 
controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C., Chapter 13, Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control. The authority of Congress to pass such 
acts is based totally on Article I, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitu-
tion. United States v. Lopez, 459 F.2d 949, 950 (5th Cir. 
1972). The Lopez Court found that: 
As the basis for the exercise of its power under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate certain activities 
in controlled substances, Congress made certain 
findings and declarations which are set forth in 
§ 101 of Title II of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801. 
Principal among these were the findings that in-
trastate incidents of the traffic in controlled 
substances, such as manufacture, local distribu-
tion and possession, had a substantial and direct 
effect on interstate commerce; that such intra-
state incidents of the traffic in controlled sub-
stances; that it was impossible to distinguish 
between substances manufactured and distributed 
intrastate from those manufactured and distributed 
interstate and, therefore, it was not feasible to 
distinguish between -such substances in terms of 
controls; and that control of the intrastate inci-
dents traffic in controlled substances was essen-
tial to the control of interstate incidents of 
that traffic. 
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Certainly those doing business in a state are liable for 
taxes on the business. Complete Auto Transit/ Inc. v. Brady, 
430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). However, it is unconstitutional to 
place a tax on interstate commerce. Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co., at 458; Hodgesin v. Ryatt Realty and Investment 
Co., Inc., 353 F.Supp. 1363, 1374 (N.D.NC 1973). 
The Supreme Court has determined that a tax on interstate 
commerce is only constitutional if it meets four criterion: 
1. It must be applied to an activity with a substantial 
nexus to the taxing state; 
2. It must be fairly apportioned; 
3. It must not discriminate against interstate commerce; 
and 
4. It must be fairly related to the services provided by 
the state. 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., at 1079. 
None of these criterion apply to the current case. 
First, the nexus to the State of Utah is slim. Kim Robinson and 
Francis Towers were merely driving through the State of Utah. 
They were not doing any business in the state. In Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc., the plaintiffs delivered automobiles from a train 
depot in Mississippi to retailers in the state. j[d. at 276. In 
another case, the Supreme Court found a sufficient nexus between 
the state of Montana and coal miners to levy a severance tax 
even though most of the coal was destined for interstate com-
merce. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617-
618 (1981). The Supreme Court quoted favorably the Montana 
Supreme Court, as stating, "there can be no argument here that a 
substantial, in fact the only, nexus of the severance of coal is 
established in Montana." ]j3. at 617. Unlike in Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. and Commonwealth Edison Co., Kim Robinson and 
Francis Towers were merely transporting a substance through 
Utah, they did not transact any business in the state or have 
ongoing relationships in the state. The Supreme Court has 
stated: "In keeping therewith, a State cannot impose taxes upon 
persons passing through the state, or coming into it merely for 
a temporary purpose such as itinerant drummers." Northwest 
States Portland Cement Co. , at 458. Therefore, since Robinson 
and Towers were merely driving through Utah, a sufficient nexus 
does not exist between their activity and the State of Utah to 
allow the state to tax their alleged activities. 
The second factor listed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 
is that the tax must be fairly apportioned. The purpose of the 
aforementioned requirement is to insure that two different 
jurisdictions do not tax the same activity. Japan Lines Ltd. v. 
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447 (1979) (a state may 
only tax those activities that occur within its boundaries. See 
Dept. of Revenue for the State of Washington v. Assoc, of Wash-
ington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 746-747 (1978). And 
while a railroad that is in the business of transportation may 
be taxed for its activity in transporting merchandise through a 
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state, an individual may not be so taxed where the merchandise 
neither originates in the state or is destined for the state. 
The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. v. Rose, 651 F.Supp. 1483, 
1480 (S.D.WV 1985) . 
The problem with the Utah statute is that it does not 
allow for apportionment. If the substance allegedly transported 
by Robinson and Towers went through ten states without appor-
tionment, each state could fully tax the merchandise. 
Historically, states have developed various 
methods ... to comply with the constitutional man-
date. The use of apportionment formulas has been 
favored because, in theory, they prevent inter-
state commerce from being cumulatively burdened by 
repeated taxation of the same incident. Addition-
ally, when taxes are directly related to suffi-
cient local activities of a multistate business, 
they are by that very fact uniquely defined and 
thus not capable of multiple application .... 
Accordingly, when the privilege taxed is exercised 
before interstate commerce begins or the tax is 
imposed upon a sufficiently local incident such as 
"storage," it has been sustained but when the 
exaction has been found to be on goods actually 
"moving in interstate commerce" or consumed there-
in, the law has succumbed under commerce clause 
attack. 
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Municipality of San 
Juan, 505 F.Supp. 533, 550-551 (D.PR 1980) (cita-
tions omitted). 
Assuming that the marijuana in the vehicle passed through 
ten states including Utah, and each state taxed it, without 
apportionment, the tax would be very high ($35.00 per gram), and 
it would unfairly discriminate against interstate commerce. 
Marijuana grown and distributed in a state could be sold for 
$31.50 less per gram than that which traveled through ten 
states. The mere fact that the alleged marijuana may not have 
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been taxed in another jurisdiction is unimportant. Without a 
proper apportionment system, a tax unconstitutionally violated 
the interstate commerce clause and cannot be collected. j[d. at 
554. 
The third factor, discrimination, is closely related to 
the apportionment factor. While the tax appears on its face to 
apply equally to marijuana produced in Utah and marijuana 
brought into the state, we must look at the effect of the legis-
lation, ^d. at 549. By failing to apportion the tax and by 
allowing other jurisdictions to fully tax the substance, the law 
provides for an unfair advantage for marijuana grown in Utah and 
such is discriminatory. 
The final factor listed in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. is 
that the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by 
the state. As the Supreme Court has stated, "when the measure 
of a tax bears no relationship to the taxpayers presence for 
activities in a state, a Court may properly conclude under the 
fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test, that the State 
is imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce." Common-
wealth Edison, at 629. The statute in question provides no 
nexus between services provided by the state and the amount of 
the tax. The tax does not vary whether the marijuana is in the 
state for five minutes or five years. Merely driving through a 
state is an insufficient nexus to prove presence in a state for 
the interstate commerce clause. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, at 
1480; Northwestern States Portland Cement Company, at 458. 
Presence requires more than the mere "moving in interstate com-
merce. n Sea-Land Services, Inc., at 551. For this hits at the 
very heart of the commerce clause. It sets up insurmountable 
boundaries to the interstate transportation of goods by requir-
ing individuals to stop at the state boundary and pay a tax for 
the right to cross the state line. It is this very right that 
has allowed for the magnificent growth of the American economy 
in contrast to that of other parts of the world. In order to 
imitate the tremendous growth in the American economy, the 
European Common Market has adopted as a major goal the abolish-
ing of all trade barriers between the European nations by 1992. 
Thus, since the state of Utah did not provide those services to 
Robinson and Tower normally provided to citizens of the state 
other than to allow them to travel across the state, the tax is 
unconstitutional under the fourth and final prong of Complete 
Auto Transit. 
II. THE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT 
IT VIOLATES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S FREEDOM FROM 
SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states that: "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." The Fifth Amendment 
provides the right not to provide information as long as that 
information may be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 
Garnev v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 (1974). The rights 
provided by the amendment arise whenever the government seeks 
information that will subject the individual to criminal liabil-
ity. Id. at 655. The federal government and most state govern-
ments outlaw the possession of marijuana. In Marchetti v. 
United States, the Supreme Court found a federal occupational 
tax on wagering to unconstitutionally require an individual to 
incriminate himself. 390 U.S. 39, 42 (1968). 
Under the federal statute in Marchetti, an individual was 
required to register with the Internal Revenue Service buy wager-
ing stamps, and post the stamps in a conspicuous place. j[d. at 
42-43. The Court found the statute created a "real and appreci-
able ... hazard of incrimination." Ld. at 48. The Supreme 
Court found that the "petitioner was confronted by a comprehen-
sive system of federal and state prohibitions against wagering 
activities, he was required to provide information which he 
might reasonably suppose would be available to prosecuting 
authorities, and which would surely prove a significant 'link in 
a chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt.'" Id. 
(citations omitted). 
While the Illegal Drug Tax Statute does not require regis-
tration, the mere purchase of the stamps is an admission of 
illegal activity under Section 59-19-107(2), Utah Code Annotated 
1953. The law does not apply to persons lawfully in possession 
of marijuana. Thus, unlike the statute in Marchetti, the mere 
purchase of the stamps is an admission of criminal behavior. In 
Marchetti, the Court found that wagering was an area permeated 
with criminal statutes and those engaging in wagering are a 
group "inherently suspect of criminal activities." JEci. at 47 
(citations omitted). In our case those subject to the statute 
are not only suspect of criminal activities but by law are 
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guilty of criminal activity. Therefore, the mere act of pur-
chasing the stamps is an admission of criminal behavior and 
being compelled to purchase such stamps violated the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Not only the compelled purchase of the stamps violates 
the Constitution but Section 59-19-104(1), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, also violates the Fifth Amendment in its requirement that 
said stamps be displayed. Knowledge of the substance is an 
element of the offense. 
Therefore, the posting of the stamps on the contraband is 
an admission that the defendant had knowledge of the illegal 
nature of the substance. As a result, the act of posting the 
stamp is a "link in a chain of evidence tending to establish his 
guilt." Id. at 48 (citation omitted). Nowhere in the act does 
it say that evidence that an individual posted the stamps on the 
contraband is inadmissible at trial to show knowledge of the 
illegal nature of the substance. 
III. THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG TAX ACT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS 
AND THEREFORE THE CONVICTION IS INVALID. 
Section 59-19-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953, forbids a 
marijuana dealer from possessing marijuana unless the illegal 
drug tax is paid upon the marijuana. Section 59-19-105(3), Utah 
Code Annotated, states: "Payments required by this chapter 
shall be made to the commission on forms provided by the com-
mission. Dealers are not required to give their name, address, 
social security number, or other identifying information on this 
form. The commission shall collect all taxes imposed under this 
chapter." Therefore, the only way the State of Utah can deter-
mine whether or not Kim Robinson and Francis Towers violated the 
law is whether or not they have properly exhibited the required 
stamps. And in fact Section 59-19-104(1), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, states: "The commission shall adopt a uniform system of 
providing, affixing and displaying official stamps, official 
labels, or other official indicia for marijuana and controlled 
substances on which a tax is imposed.i' 
The commission has failed to adopt any regulations under 
Section 59-19-104(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953. As a result, 
Kim Robinson and Francis Towers had no directions on where to 
place said stamps. Furthermore, the arresting officer could not 
know where to look for the stamps. Therefore, the law, lacking 
the required regulations, failed to provide sufficient guidance 
to Kim Robinson and Francis Towers on how to comply with the law 
and it failed to provide the arresting officers with a method of 
determining whether Kim Robinson and Francis Towers were in vio-
lation of the law. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution prohibits vague laws. Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 
(1982) . 
Vague laws offend several important values. 
First, because we assume that man is free to steer 
between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist 
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence 
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibit-
ed, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warn-
ing. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory 
1/ Please see Attachment A, ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT, UTAH 
CODE ANN. §58-19-101-107 (1988). 
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them, A 
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy 
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for reso-
lution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
applications. 
The Supreme Court has declared that, lfas generally stated 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute 
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in 
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 466 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the prin-
ciple that "a statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague 
that persons of common intelligence must necessar-
ily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application, violated the first essential of due 
process of law." The requirement that government 
articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of 
clarity ensures that state power will be exercised 
only on behalf of policies reflecting an authori-
tative choice among competing social values, 
reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination 
in the administration of the laws, enables indi-
viduals to conform their conduct to the require-
ment of law, and permits meaningful judicial re-
view. 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
629 (1984) (citations omitted). 
A law such as the Utah illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, unac-
companied by the required regulations "confers on police a vir-
tually unrestrained power to arrest and charge a person with a 
violation of the [statute] is unconstitutional because the 
opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a 
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virtually open-ended interpretation is self evident." Board of 
Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for 
Jesus, Inc., U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 2568, 2573 (1987). Without 
the legally required regulations, the statute is unconstitution-
ally vague in that it fails to provide citizens with the know-
ledge necessary to allow them to comply with the law in that a 
dealer does not know where to place the stamp in order to follow 
the law. Also, without the regulations state agents cannot tell 
whether or not an individual is complying with the law since 
they do not know where to look for the properly posted stamps. 
As a result the opportunity for abuse and illegal arrests is 
flagrant in that the authorities cannot determine what behaviors 
violate the law since they cannot determine whether an individ-
ual has obtained the stamps and whether the stamps are properly 
posted. 
Certainly in interpreting the validity of a statute in 
light of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a Court may consider 
other judicial or enforcement agency regulations. Kolender, at 
355. But in this case the State Tax Commission has failed to 
fulfill its mandated task of developing such regulations. As a 
result the statute without the required regulations must be 
found to be constitutionally invalid. 
-49-
X. CONCLUSION 
Based on the authorities presented, defendants, Robinson and 
Towers seek reversal of their convictions on Count I because it was based 
on illegally seized evidence and reversal of their convictions and an 
acquittal on Count II because the conviction was based on a statute which 
is unconstitutional. 
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ADDEMDUM " A " 
II.I.KGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT 59-19-103 
CHAPTER 19 
ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT 
ecLion 
9-19-101 
•9-19-102 
.9-19-103 
•9-19-104 
>9-19-105 
Short title 
Definitions 
Tax imposed on marihuana and 
controlled substances 
Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be 
provided and sold by the com-
mission 
Stamps to be affixed to mari-
huana and controlled substance 
Section 
59-19 106 
59-19-107 
— Anonymity provided when 
purchasing stamps 
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Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1988 ch 11, 
^ 1 to 14, also enacted a new * r)9 19 101 et 
M.«q Because of the enactment of ^ 59-19-101 
et seq by Laws 1988 ch 246, H 1 to 7, the 
provisions enacted by Laws 1988, ch 11, were 
renumbered as ^ 59 20-101 et seq 
59-19-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act." 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-101, enacted by L. Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, § 8 
1988, ch . 246, $ 1. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988 
59-19-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Controlled substance" means any drug or substance, whether real 
or counterfeit, as defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, trans-
ported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold m violation of Utah laws. It 
does not include marihuana 
(2) "Dealer" means a person who, in violation of Utah law, manufac-
tures, produces, ships, transports, or imports into Utah or in any manner 
acquires or possesses more than 42V-2 grams of mar ihuana , or seven or 
more grams of any controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units of 
any controlled substance which is not sold by weight 
(3) "Marihuana" means any marihuana, whether real or counterfeit, as 
defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, transported, trans-
ferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-102, enacted by L. 
1988. ch. 246, * 2. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch 246, * 8 
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988 
59-19-103. Tax imposed on mar ihuana and controlled sub-
stances. 
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled substances as defined 
under this chapter at the following rates* 
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a gram, $3 50; 
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(b) on each gram of controlled substance, or each portion of a gram, 
$200, and 
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not sold by 
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000 
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under this chapter, a quant i ty of 
nar ihuana or other controlled substance is measured by the weight of the 
ubstance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by dosage units when the 
ubstance is not sold by weight, in the dea le rs possession A quant i ty of a 
ontrolled substance is dilute if it consists of a detectable quant i ty of pure 
ontrolled substance and any excipients or fillers 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-103, enacted by L. Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, § 8 
988, ch . 246, $ 3. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988 
S9-19-104. Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be provided and 
sold by the commission. 
(1) The commission shall adopt a uniform system of providing, affixing, and 
'isplaying official stamps, official labels, or other official indicia for mari-
mana and controlled substances on which a tax is imposed 
(2) A dealer may not possess any marihuana or controlled substance upon 
v^hich a tax is imposed by this chapter, unless the tax has been paid on the 
nar ihuana or other controlled substance as evidenced by a s tamp or other 
fflcial indicia 
(3) Official stamps, labels, or other indicia to be affixed to all mar ihuana or 
ontrolled substances shall be purchased from the commission The purchaser 
hall pay 100% of face value for each stamp, label, or other indicia at the t ime 
f the purchase 
History. C. 1953, 59-19-10-1, enacted by L. Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246 ^ 8 
988, ch 246, § 4 makes the act effective on April 1, 1988 
•9-19-105- Stamps to be affixed to m a r i h u a n a and con-
trolled substance — Anonymity provided when 
purchasing stamps. 
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires, transports, or imports into this s ta te 
l a n h u a n a or controlled substances, he shall permanently affix the official 
idicia on the marihuana or controlled substances evidencing the payment of 
le tax required under this chapter No stamp or other official indicia may be 
sed more than once 
(2) Taxes imposed upon marihuana or controlled substances by this chapter 
re due and payable immediately upon acquisition or possession in this s ta te 
y a dealer 
(3) Payments required by this chapter shall be made to the commission on 
•rms provided by the commission Dealers are not required to give their 
ame, address, Social Security number, or other identifying information on 
ie form. The commission shall collect all taxes imposed under this chapter 
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History: C 1953, 59-19-105, enacted by L Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, <> 8 
SS9 ch. 246, § 5 makes the act effective on April 1, 1988 
9-19-106. Civil penalty — Criminal penal ty — Statute of 
limitations — Burden of proof. 
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter is subject to a penalty of 100% of the 
ix in addition to the tax imposed by Section 59-19-103 The penalty shall be 
>llected as part of the tax 
(2) In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possess-
lg mar ihuana or controlled substances without affixing the appropriate 
tamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a felony of the third degree and is 
ubject to a fine of not more than $10,000, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the criminal laws of this state, 
n information, indictment, or complaint may be filed upon any criminal 
ffense under this chapter within six years after the commission of this of-
ense 
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by the commission are presumed to be 
ahd and correct The burden is on the taxpayer to show their incorrectness or 
nvahdity. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-106, enacted by L Effective Dates — Laws 1988 ch 246, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 6. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988 
59-19-107. Commission to administer tax — No criminal 
immunity for dealers. 
(1) The commission shall administer this chapter and may adopt rules nec-
essary to enforce this chapter 
(2) Nothing in this chapter requires persons lawfully in possession of mari-
huana or a controlled substance to pay the tax required under this chapter 
(3) Nothing in this chapter provides immunity of any kind for a dealer from 
criminal prosecution under Utah law 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-107, enacted by L. Effective Dates — Laws 1988, ch 246, <> 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 7. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988 
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